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In April, 1953, the North Dakota Law Review was able to reprint the text of a lecture on the Scandinavian law of torts which
ProfessorHenry Ussing of the University of Copenhagen, Denmark,
delivered at this law school while visiting the United States. Professor Ussing's discussion stressed the impact of insurance upon tort
law and inspired Mr. Robert S. Marx to submit to the Review a discussion entitled "Let's Compensate - Not Litigate." This was reprinted in January, 1954. The Review is now able to present a vigorous rejoinder to Mr. Marx' fine article ...

WHAT ABOUT THE NON-NEGLIGENT
INJURED PARTY?
P. W. LANMiR, SR.*

THE

ARTICLE in the North Dakota Law Review entitled "Let's
Compensate - Not Litigate"' is ably written by an able lawyer.
In passing I note this article was first printed in the Federation of
Insurance Counsel Quarterly.- So let's proceed with the natural
presumption that Mr. Robert S. Marx, the author of this article, is at
least slightly prejudiced. On the other hand, let us proceed with
the further presumption that I, in view of the fact that I am a
plaintiff's lawyer, may also be somewhat prejudiced.
I join with Mr. Marx in asking the question he poses at the
outset of his article: "How much longer shall we try to force an
automobile-atomic age into a legal pattern cut to fit the horse and
buggy days of a century ago?" But I also ask: "Is the great backlog of personal injury cases a good reason for establishing a system
that would take away from an injured party either his common law
or statutory right to recover for personal injuries incurred without
negligence on his part?" And still a further question: "Is it right to
make the careful person free from actionable negligence pay for the
injury to a negligent person?"
Certainly anything that will reduce personal injury cases is in
order and much to be desired. But the fact that something is going
to reduce the number of lawsuits does not mean that it will adequately compensate a person who in the exercise of ordinary care
is negligently injured by the act or omission of another. And this
* Member of the Cass County Bar.
1. 30 N.Dak.L.Rev. 20 (1954).
2. 3 Federation of Ins. Counsel Q. 62 (1953).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

is the all-important factor. The remedy needed is one that will leave
to the person injured who feels that he was not at fault his right of
action for damages to be tried by a jury of his peers. How this can
be done is the sixty-four dollar question.
Chapter 162 of the Session Laws of North Dakota for 1919
was the beginning of what is euphemistically termed Workmen's
Compensation in this state. In the caption of the Act it is stated:
"An act creating the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Fund, for the benefit of employees injured and the dependents
of employees killed in hazardous employment."
Under this act, all common law and statutory remedies against
employers falling within the coverage of the act - which is very
extensive - are barred.:
Workmen's Compensation Laws have done much to give financial aid to persons and their dependents who never had a chance of
recovery in a common-law action or one based on statute. But in
the schedules of payments the maximums have been fixed at a
figure that obviously contemplates taking away from the careful
employee and adding to the negligent employees's compensation.
The caption of the act introducing compensation laws is misleading to a major extent. The insurance companies, through their
actuarial departments, have been carefully watching and summarizing developments under the various Workmen's Compensation
Laws, and have definitely decided that it is to the advantage of
liability insurance companies to compensate and not litigate, by
paying all persons injured, if and when cases of actionable negligence can be limited in recoveries to a ridiculously low figure.
To illustrate, the schedule of workmen's compensation benefits
in North Dakota compensates an employee for the loss of an arm at
the shoulder by a payment of $22 per week for 250 weeks, or a total
of $5,500. If suit were permitted in such a case and actionable
negligence could be proven, this situation might well result in a
verdict of from $35,000 to $75,000 or more. Yet a careful claimant
will get $5,500 while just across the street, perhaps under the same
employer, a grossly negligent employee loses his arm at the shoulder
and is entitled to precisely the same compensation.
Who is paying for whom? The caption says that the law is for
the benefit of the "employee and his dependents." For which
employee? The answer is obvious: the negligent employee. At

3. N.D. Rev. Code § 65-0428 (1943).
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whose expense? The answer: at the expense of the careful employee.
The foregoing illustration applies to the schedule generally.
And some cases are not taken care of in the schedules in any way.
To illustrate: a woman came to me who was working in a room
where there was an unguarded, unprotected shaft upon which pulleys operated. Her work required her to go close to this exposed
shaft. In leaning for some purpose, her shirtwaist was caught on
the shaft and quickly she was drawn against the shaft and one of
her breasts was torn away, causing a painful, horrible wound
and permanent disfigurement. She was a healthy woman and recovered without permanent disability - doctor bills and measly
payments.
This case illustrates many injuries for which recovery substantially is barred. For pain and suffering, nothing is allowed.
For disfigurement, nothing is allowed.
Should we wonder when we read about insurance company
lawyers who say, "Let's Compensate-Not Litigate?" But, says the
insurance lawyer, when the employer pays his premiums he should
have protection. The insured is not protected against a law suit,
this is true; and he should not be at the expense of the injured.
But the premium could well be adjusted by the actuarial departments of insurance companies in such a way as to substantially
reduce premiums for liability insurance without barring a worthy
case from being tried to a jury by the injured party.
I say let's compensate. But if necessary to compensate, let's
litigate. Finally, any form of compensation in insurance liability
cases based upon a schedule should not take away from the injured
party his common law or statutory remedies. The right to trial by
jury should not be denied any American.
One way, and I am not prepared just yet to say it is the best,
would be to have compensation without litigation such as Mr. Marx
suggests, with the right of election by a claimant as to whether he
takes under the compensation laws or proceeds under the common
law or such statutory law as he now has, with the provision that if
he elects not to take under the compensation laws he would, if he
failed to recover in his lawsuit, only collect three-fourths or some
sum less than provided by the schedule of his compensation under
the compensation laws. This would discourage the nuisance cases
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and thereby give great relief against the backlog of personal injury
cases cluttering calendars in congested centers.
To say, however, to a careful person injured without personal
fault, "We are withholding from you a part of what you should
have and giving it to one who was negligent" just is not right under
the theory of American jurisprudence.
I could go into a long discussion on the subject of what claim
departments of insurance companies could do today under present
conditions toward giving relief against the backlog of cases complained of by showing that, if fair settlements were made, there
would be fewer cases on the calendars. Knowing how long it takes
to bring a case to trial is used many times to force unjust settlements on worthy claimants with serious injuries. But space will not
admit of this discussion just now.
"Fault, which is at the theoretical bottom of liability, is largely
fiction," says Mr. Marx. With this statement I take positive issue.
Then he says: "Who wins depends upon both the vagaries of the
trial and the vagaries of the jury." When applied to all personal
injury cases, this is not a fact. To admit that such assertions are
true is to strike at the very foundation of our jury system under
the fundamental law of the federal and the several state governments, which our forefathers have sought to have safeguarded.
There are, it is true, many many personal injury cases which
are filed for nuisance purposes and should never have been brought.
But there are also a great many cases that are eminently proper
for submission to a jury as the trier of facts under proper instructions from the courts. And there are many cases, as well, where
there is little if any doubt as to liability; the disagreement rests in
how much should be paid. A remedy that would eliminate nuisance
cases would go a long way in eliminating congestion in metropolitan centers both by making fewer cases and by taking away
from claim departments the threat held over the heads of injured
parties that it will be years before money is paid unless an unfair
adjustment is made in cases of definite negligence.
I quote Mr. Marx again:
"The amount of the verdict is equally speculative. It is frequently too big or too low. There is no standard upon which
juries base the amounts of their verdicts."
Much truth lies in this statement.
Many conditions contribute to such diversification. Economic
conditions cover practically all the reasons for this divergence. Is
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this a reason for abolishing the jury system? If so, then the same
arguments can be used against a jury in a criminal case. Under
convictions under our criminal laws, widely divergent sentences
are imposed by different judges for identical offenses. Even in our
federal courts this is true. Shall we abolish our jury system and install a uniform practice under which offenses, whether committed
with criminal intent or not, will meet with equal punishment for
the innocent and the guilty alike? It might as well be suggested
that there be a uniform sentence for murder, first, second or any
other degree, but that the penalty be made moderate so that the
innocent, that is the defendant who has been guilty of justifiable
homicide, will pay part of the penalty for the cold-blooded
murderer.
Of course we want more uniform laws and uniform application of such laws, and we are working in that direction. But let us
not be misled by high-sounding phrases such as "Let's Compensate
- Not Litigate." Workmen's Compensation Laws were inaugurated
as progressive, and they were intended so to be; but in their
operations they have been costly to the careful employee who has
been deprived of his right to a jury trial and forced to take under
a schedule which pays to the careless as much as it does to the
careful.
This article is not intended to resist progress. The condition to
which Mr. Marx refers is one that needs much remedying. But let
us see that the remedy is not worse than the ailment. And that is
exactly what we would have if the entire Marx plan, as is, is set in
operation.
So, a remedy that fixes a schedule that covers all injuries,
available to all injured parties, the negligent and the non-negligent
alike, is acceptable provided it leaves to the injured party his
option to proceed under the common law or statutory law as it now
exists, and further provides that the election to so proceed in case
of failure will carry a penalty reducing the amount recoverable
under the schedule. This is a move in the right direction without
the sudden abandonment of our fundamental law.
It has been correctly said that as to vulnerability to attack
upon constitutional grounds the statutes providing for workmen's
compensation fall into two groups:
1. Those which are optional and afford an opportunity to the
parties to elect whether or not they will be bound by them; and
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2. Those which are compulsory and furnish no such election. 4
My remarks are addressed particularly to the second group.
And while the courts have been getting around this constitutional
objection they have been doing so reluctantly fand with their fingers
crossed. When we come to apply to the whole field of personal
injuries rules which abrogate trial by jury, the courts must stop,
look, and listen unless they are willing to get away from the
fundamentals of American government.
When money is plentiful and freely in circulation and the cost
of living is high, generally verdicts are higher. And verdicts vary in
sections where these conditions vary; the well-known fact that in
agricultural sections verdicts are lower than in industrial centers
attests as much.
Of course where the insured pays the required premium and
the right of election is permitted, and there is an election and trial
and judgment in favor of plaintiff, the premium fixed and paid
should protect the insured, and the actuarial departments of
liability insurance companies would naturally take into consideration this contingency in arriving at a fixed premium. But even
here, owing to the removal of nuisance cases and the early settlement or trial of cases where plaintiffs have elected not to take
under the compensation laws, there would generally be a reduction of premiums and delay incident to personal injury cases.
In the early days of Workmen's Compensation Laws, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky considered this question, and its discussion is well worth listening to today when we contemplate
broadening the operation of the theory under which Workmen's
Compensation Laws are now being administered. The court had
this to say:
"When an injured employee elects to decline the compensation
given him by this Board, why should he be denied these causes
of action- why penalized in this way? To this there is but
one answer, and that is: It was the purpose and intent of this
Act to compel an employee to accept its provision and take the
compensation allowed by the Board in lieu of any cause of
action he might have against his employer for his injuries.
When the employer accepts the provisions of this act, the employee is automatically drawn into this so-called contract and
made subject to its provisions upon pain of being deprived of
all his causes of action. It cannot, then, be said that he has
voluntarily elected to accept the provisions of the contract, because he is told that unless he accepts the provisions of this
4. 58 Am. Jur. 580.

WHAT ABOUT THE NON-NEGLIGENT INJURED PARTY?

Act he will be deprived of all these causes of action. This certainly imposes a limitation upon his right to recover . . . His
election should be free, not even in the alternative. The law
has no right to force him to accept the compensation fixed by
this Board by depriving him of his causes of action. The only
remedy left to him is to accept what he can get from this Compensation Board. The action of the employer in paying into
this fund his premiums and accepting the benefits of this Act
necessarily brings the employee within the Act. The employee
can go nowhere else; he has been legislated out of his causes of
action, and all he can do is accept such amount as' is allowed
him by this Board of Compensation. The legislature has no
right to say to one of its citizens that 'unless you accept the
provisions of a law impairing your constitutional rights, it will
take from you other rights more valuable.'
"If any employer should determine that he wanted to carry his
own risk and make his own contracts, instead of having the law
to make a contract for him, he can do so. He can operate his
industries and pursue his business, however hazardous, and
ignore this Act entirely. But what is the result? The law says
to this employer: "You may go on with your business industries,
but if one of your employees is injured or killed you shall not
avail yourself of the following defenses: the defense of the
fellow servant; the defense of the assumption of risk; or the
defense of contributory negligence.'
"These are practically all the defenses the employer has, and
they are taken from his unless he accepts the provisions of this
Act. He cannot, under these conditions, successfully defend
any suit for personal injury. If he is sued by an injured employee, about the only question a jury will have to determine
will be the amount of recovery. Under these conditions an employer has practically no choice, no volition. If he continues to
operate his business, he is compelled to pay his premiums into
the fund and accept the provisions of the Act.
"It has been well said in one of the briefs: The employer is
told: 'You may refuse to accept the provisions of this Act, but
if any suit is instituted against you for injuries received by your
employees, you are deprived of all defenses thereto, and to all
intents and purposes a default judgment will be rendered
against you.'
"We cannot subscribe to the proposition that this is a voluntary
contract, even on the part of the employer."'
So it can be seen that both employer and employee have been
deprived of fundamental rights under the general theory of Workmen's Compensation. However, it must be admitted that much
good has come to many people on account of payments received
5. Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compnsation Board, 161

S.W. 1166, 1169 (1916).

Ky. 562, 170
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through Workmen's Compensation laws. But no one has stopped to
figure out yet how much has been taken away from injured people
by virtue of having them placed compulsively under a fixed schedule of damages for personal injuries in cases where there was absolute liability.
Certainly we need progress in this field, but we must keep in
mind that the right to trial by jury must remain inviolate if we are
to keep our American form of government.

